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The aim of this paper is to formulate an approximation of the US actuarial balance model and apply 
it to the Spanish public retirement pension system under various scenarios in order to determine a 
consistent indicator of the system's financial state comparable to those used by the most advanced 
social security systems. This will enable us to answer the question as to whether there is any 
justification for reforming the pension system in Spain. This type of actuarial balance uses 
projections to show future challenges to the financial side of the pension system deriving basically 
from ageing, the projected increase in longevity and fluctuations in economic activity. If one is 
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pay-as-you-go system by bringing the planning horizons of politicians and the system itself closer 
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1.-Introduction 
According to Boado-Penas et al (2009) and Vidal-Meliá et al. (2010), the actuarial 
balance of the pay-as-you-go (PAYG) system is a response to the growing social demand 
for transparency in the management of public finances, the need to protect the PAYG 
system from populism in pensions, and the desire to give the system more credibility in the 
eyes of contributors and pensioners. It also provides a positive incentive to improve the 
management of the system as it minimizes the traditional differences between the planning 
horizons of electors, politicians (often only four years at most) and the system itself 
(between 33 and 100 years).  
There are basically two options when it comes to compiling the actuarial balance 
(AB) for the PAYG system: what are known as the Swedish and US models1. Although 
both models have very different characteristics and strengths2
The underlying methodology on which the US model is based - Aggregate 
Accounting Models - has been used by various researchers in Spain and other countries
, the Swedish model can be 
briefly summed up as showing the actuarial (im)balance in pension systems using 
comprehensible language in the shape of assets and liabilities without needing to use 
projections. However, it can only be applied to the pension contingency. The US model, 
on the other hand, uses projections to highlight future challenges to the financial side 
deriving basically from ageing, the projected increase in longevity and fluctuations in 
economic activity. 
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In this paper we draw up an approximation of the US actuarial balance model and 
apply it to the Spanish public retirement pension system under various scenarios in order to 
determine a consistent indicator of the system's financial health comparable to those used 
by the most advanced SSAs. This will enable us to answer the question as to whether there 
is any justification for the unexpected pension reform that was recently introduced in 
Spain
, 
although the actuarial balance approach barely makes an appearance in the literature. The 
paper dealing with Spain that most resembles US actuarial balance philosophy is the one by 
Doménech & Melguizo (2008), which introduces uncertainty through the use of 27 
different scenarios and presents a number of financial sustainability indicators similar to 
those used by the Social Security Administration (SSA). However, there are also significant 
differences such as the planning horizon (64 years rather than 75), the level of data 
aggregation, no detailed model showing the interaction between financial, economic and 
actuarial aspects, the fact that the indicators refer to GDP and not the system's 
contribution bases, and the way in which uncertainty is quantified.  
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1 For more details see Försäkringskassan (2010) for Sweden and BOT (2010) and OACT (2009) for the US. 
. This reform can be considered unexpected because, according to official MTIN 
2 See the papers by Boado-Penas et al (2011), Vidal-Meliá & Boado-Penas (2011) and Vidal-Meliá et al. (2010) 
for the main differences and similarities between both types of AB as regards objectives, information 
provided, structure, projections, valuation of assets/revenues, discount rate, effects on 
contributors/pensioners, solvency/sustainability indicators, transparency and applicability.  
3 See the papers by Balmaceda et al (2006), Doménech & Melguizo (2008) or Jiménez-Ridruejo et al. (2009) 
among others. 
4 At the draft bill stage as at May 2011. The changes are important ones and substantially alter retirement 
pension expectations for young and middle-aged contributors. The legal retirement age will rise progressively 
from today's 65 to age 67. This will be applied over a transitory period from 2013 to 2027, and in order to 
receive 100% pension it will be necessary to have contributed 37 years as opposed to the current 35. A 100% 
pension will be possible at age 65 with 38.5 years contributions rather than 35 today. Early retirement will be 
possible from age 63 with 33 years contributions or at age 61 in times of economic crisis. There will be better 
incentives for extending the working lifetime, the period for calculating the qualifying base will increase from 
15 to 25 years, and the percentage of the full pension received by a worker will be proportional to the 
numbers of years contributed, starting at 50% for 15 working years up to 100% for 37 working years. By 
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(2008) information issued in October 2008, the forecast was that the Spanish public 
pension system would have no financial difficulties until at least 2029, when in fact the 
system already had a current treasury deficit in 2010. In Spain there has always been a 
difference between what politicians say and what the experts say, as Boado-Penas et al 
(2011) have pointed out. The government authorities had systematically denied that the 
pension system had sustainability problems, a situation that was not helped by the absence 
of an official actuarial balance. 
As far as we are aware, there is a large gap in the literature which we are attempting 
fill with this paper because, until now, this area of study has not been looked at from the 
perspective of the US actuarial balance, nor with the set of indicators that may be derived 
from it. We also aim to show the advisability of making it compulsory for an actuarial 
balance to be compiled for the Spanish public pension system every year in order to 
improve its transparency and solvency, thereby forming part of the trend seen in certain 
other countries of introducing a methodology typical of accounting and actuarial analysis 
into the public management of PAYG systems. 
The structure of the paper is as follows. After this brief introduction, Section 2 
describes the US-style actuarial balance, how it is usually presented and what methodology 
it is based on. Section 3 gives details of the data, assumptions and subsequent scenarios. 
Section 4 analyses the results obtained focusing especially on the best-estimate scenario, 
while Section 5 gives our conclusions and final comments. The paper ends with the 
bibliographical references and three appendixes which we briefly develop the approach of 
the aggregate accounting model, show the actuarial, economic and demographic 
relationships that enable the model to be formulated and present the results broken down 
into greater detail. 
2.-The PAYG actuarial balance: US model 
This actuarial balance is aimed at measuring the system's financial sustainability with 
an n-year time horizon (75 years in the US and Canada, and 95 in Japan5

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). It measures the 
difference in present value - discounted by the projected yield on trust fund assets - 
between spending on pensions and income from contributions, expressed as a percentage 
of the present value of the contribution bases for that time horizon, taking into account 
that the level of financial reserves (trust fund) at the end of the time horizon reaches a 
magnitude of one year's expenditure. Both the income and the expenditure are discounted 
using the projected return on the financial assets in each period. In simplified form, the AB 
can be expressed as: 
 [1.] 
                                                                                                                                               
comparison, the system pre-reform was biased in favour of shorter working lifetimes. Finally, a so-called 
sustainability factor will be introduced from 2027 based on the evolution of life expectancy for 67-year-olds, 
although it appears to be more like an automatic balance mechanism as a sustainability factor cannot be based 
on the evolution of life expectancy alone. 
5 See details in OSFIC (2008) for Canada and AAD (2009) for Japan. The papers by GAD (2010) for the UK 
and Elo et al (2010) for Finland are also relevant. 
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which, in a situation of financial equilibrium for the valuation period, should give a zero 
value where: TF0 : Value of assets (reserve fund) at the beginning of the valuation period; 
tIT : Income from contributions plus government transfers if any in year t; tEP : 
Expending on pensions in year t; tACB : Aggregate contribution base in year t; r : 
Projected yield on trust fund assets; and TFn : Value of assets at the end of the valuation 
period. 
The typical way in which the actuarial balance is presented includes the basic 
elements shown in Table 1, although there is no standard model. 
Table 1: Elements of the n-year actuarial balance 
Present value at January of year t. Scenario X. 
1 Contributions 
2 Benefits 
2-1=3 Initial deficit 
4 Trust fund assets at start of period 
5=3+4 Open group unfunded obligation 
6 End target trust fund 
7=5+6 Results for the period 
8 Aggregate contribution bases 
9=(1+4)/(8)% Summarized income rate 
10=(2+6)/(10)% Summarized cost rate 
11=(9-10)% Actuarial balance  
12 Year of first deficit 
13 Reserve fund exhausted (year) 
Source: Own based on BOT (2010) 
The open group unfunded obligation is the present value of the debt that would 
have to be incurred to fund the payments that have been promised, wiping out all the 
financial assets. This should not be confused with the system's implicit debt at a particular 
date. The calculation of the actuarial balance includes the cost of accumulating a target trust 
fund balance equal to 100% of annual costs by the end of the period. 
The way the balance is presented in Table 1, based on cash flow statements, as 
Jackson (2004) points out, highlights the system’s annual “surpluses” and its reserves. This 
undermines efforts to address social security reform proposals by locating the timing of 
scheme crisis far off in the future, when the trust fund is expected to be exhausted, 
especially if the treasury deficit is expected to take a while to appear, and tends to delay the 
application of solutions. 
Table 2: The US actuarial balance model as a balance sheet.  
ASSETS LIABILITIES 
Reserve fund at start of period (1)  Present value of benefits (3) 
Present value of contributions (2) Present value of end target trust fund (4) 
Present value of deficit (net) 
((3)+(4)-(1)-(2))>0 
Present value of surplus (net) 
((1)+(2)-(3)-(4))>0 
Total Assets Total Liabilities 
Source: Own. 
Table 2 shows an alternative presentation that may make it easier to understand the 
system's financial situation. It also provides an immediate solvency indicator in the form of 
an accounting balance sheet in which the assets are the reserve fund at the start of the 
period and the present value of contributions, while the liabilities are represented by the 
present value of benefits and the present value of the target trust fund at the end of the 
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period. The items used to balance the accounts if the elements above do not tally are the 
present value of the estimated deficit (resources the promoter needs to provide to cover all 
the scheduled benefits) or, in the opposite case, the present value of the surplus that would 
eventually manifest itself as an excessively large target reserve fund at the end of the 
projection horizon.  
The solvency ratio ( RSt ) indicator used (Table 2) emerges from the balance sheet 
and is expressed as:  
 RS        
(4) fund Reserve(3) benefits of luePresent va
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t
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+
==                       [2.] 
  
Figure 1: Aggregate accounting projection model and the US actuarial balance. 
Source: Boado-Penas et al (2011). 
The main methodology used to compile the US actuarial balance might best be 
described as an aggregate accounting projection model of spending on pensions (AAM). 
This approach, as shown in Figure 1, basically relies on making a variety of assumptions 
regarding the economy as a whole, taking into account future trends in demography 
(fertility rates, migration flows, life expectancy), economic conditions (participation and 
employment rates, productivity, wages, interest rates) and the rules governing the pension 
system (coverage, pension levels). 
Expending on
pensions
(4)
Contributors,
by gender, age, 
regime
Contributions
Pensioners,
by age, gender, 
regime
Benefits
The rules governing the 
system    (3)
Income from
contributions
(4)
Actuarial balance and solvency indicator (RSt) (formulas 1-2) (5)
Macroeconomic 
assumptions
(1)
Socio-demographic
scenarios
(2)
Demographic 
assumptions
(1)
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AAMs are mainly used to make aggregate projections for spending on pensions in 
relation to GDP - see Equation 4 in Appendix 1 - although SSAs adopt a more financial 
approach and use it to evaluate the projected social security deficit, usually in relation to the 
aggregate pensionable earnings (Equation 7 in Appendix 1). This approach is used in 
Appendix 2 as a basis for developing a detailed model of the main economic, financial and 
actuarial relations that enable the actuarial balance to be compiled6
3.-Data, assumptions and socio-demographic scenarios 
. 
3.1.-Data and assumptions 
The formulation of the actuarial balance in this paper is based on the assumption 
that legislation - the rules governing the system that were in force in 2009 - remains 
constant throughout the projection period. As far as possible we also apply the principle of 
verifiable data or transactions at the date the balance was compiled, which means being 
aware of anything that occurred in the recent past, i.e. the last three or five years depending 
on the case, and checking against official sources whenever possible. The number of 
contributors by age and gender, for example, is obtained independently for each regime as 
the product of the working population and the proportion of them that actually make 
contributions; an average of 94.25% of the working population made contributions to 
social security during 2007, 2008 and 2009. This calculation needs to be carried out due to 
the discrepancy that exists between the figures for working population provided by the 
quarterly surveys of the labour market carried out by the Instituto Nacional de Estadística 
(INE - the National Institute of Statistics) and the number of currently working affiliates 
supplied by the Instituto Nacional de la Seguridad Social (INSS- the National Institute of 
Social Security).  
Official sources are also used for the evolution of the contribution bases for each 
type of contributor. These are conditional upon the average contribution base, salary scales 
and the growth rate of the contribution base. The average contribution base for 2009 was 
obtained from the Ministry of Work and Immigration (Ministerio de Trabajo e Inmigración 
- MTIN) (2010), while the salary scales have been constructed based on the Continuous 
Sample of Working Lives (Muestra Continua de Vidas Laborales - MCVL) for 20097
The overall contributions made in the Spanish social security system are not 
allocated explicitly to different contingencies, and therefore some kind of assumption 
needs to be made to enable us to find this information. The proportion of the total 
contributions for common contingencies allocated as income to cover the retirement 
contingency will be equal to the percentage of total spending on pensions represented by 
spending on retirement pensions. This calculation has already been carried out by Boado-
Penas et al (2008). It is assumed that the contribution rate earmarked for the retirement 
pension contingency in the general regime is 19.02%, in the self-employed regime 18.48%, 
household workers19.46%, coal mining 20.49%, sea workers 19.23% and agriculture 
12.08%. Apart from the income from contributions, it is assumed that the state provides 
. 
                                                 
6 It is worth mentioning that the only formula shown in Doménech & Melguizo's (2008) paper to justify the 
results is equivalent to Equation 4 in Appendix 1. In the paper by Jiménez-Ridruejo et al. (2009), although it 
includes a number of very detailed aspects such as the evolution of immigration and productivity, the 
relations of how pensioners and the average pension evolve are carried out using econometric equations 
unrelated to actuarial methodology, while in AFI (2009) there is no mention of any type of model to justify 
the results. 
7 According to MTAS (2006), the MCVL is a set of microdata containing the career movements of over a 
million anonymous people, i.e. it contains the contracts involved in the employment history along with the 
monthly contributions for each person selected for the sample. 
 7 
funding to help cover the supplement to the minimum retirement benefits8
The starting point for projecting pension spending is the number of retirement 
pensioners and their average pension, broken down by age, gender and the social security 
regime they were registered in at 31 December 2009. We realize that an error is already 
being committed here at the start due to the fact that the figures cannot be broken down 
any further - some of the pensioners we take into account will have originally come from a 
different contingency, i.e. disability, but for administrative reasons they are classified as 
retirement pensioners once they reach age 65. 
. Following the 
principle of verifiable data and transactions, it will be assumed that state funding will cover 
35.67% of the total supplement to the minimum retirement benefits. We therefore estimate 
the amount spent on retirement pensions that corresponds to the state contribution to the 
supplement to the minimum retirement benefits and then add it on as other social security 
income      
New retirees by age, gender, total years contributed and regime are obtained from 
the product of the new pensions coefficient and the number of people entitled to opt for 
retirement. The evolution of this variable is determined by demography and rates of 
employment. The new pensions coefficient itself is assumed to remain constant throughout 
the projection period in line with the average obtained from the last five years.  
The main hypotheses for determining the average amount of new pensions are: 1.-
The distribution of new pensions by age and gender remains constant and equal to the 
average distribution of the last three years; 2.-The recorded number of years contributed 
when determining the amount of pension also remains constant and equal to the average of 
the last three years; and 3.-The regulating base will evolve in accordance with Equation 36 
in Appendix 2, based on the values recorded for 2009. These three hypotheses have been 
estimated from the MCVL for 2009. 
3.2 Socio-demographic scenarios 
Demography 
In January 2010 the National Institute of Statistics (Instituto Nacional de 
Estadística - INE) (2010) published new estimates as to the future evolution of the 
population of Spain for the period 2009-20489
In order to recognize the uncertainty surrounding demographic evolution over the 
projection period, three sets of hypotheses are established that have an effect on the main 
elements determining the evolution of population, fertility, migration and mortality. Each 
assumption will determine a particular demographic scenario. The first is designated the 
"best estimate" or normal scenario and is based on the hypotheses established by the INE 
up to 2048. The second and third scenarios are designated "favourable" or optimistic and 
"unfavourable" or pessimistic. After 2048 the various assumptions for each scenario will 
remain constant at the values reached on that date for the remaining part of the projection 
period. 
, the main points of which are the following: 
1.-Population growth will progressively decrease over the next few decades; 2.-There will 
be negative population growth from 2020 onwards; and 3.-The population over age 64 will 
double over the next 40 years and represent over 30% of the total.  
                                                 
8 The extra amount needed to reach the minimum pension that should be funded through taxes. 
9 The INE projections are based on the component method. This involves making a projection for each 
population group, by age and gender, using hypotheses regarding the future evolution of fertility, mortality 
and migration. For more information on this methodology see INE (2009). 
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The decade from 1998 to 2008 saw an improvement in the different fertility 
indicators for Spain. The overall fecundity rate10
As far as migration is concerned, the INE assumes a net average migratory flow of 
70,000 people a year. The first ten years of the projection take into account the effect of 
the economic crisis on this variable, which in quantitative terms translates into a significant 
reduction in the average migratory flow down to an average net migration of around 40,000 
people. The optimistic and pessimistic scenarios assume net average migratory flows of 
100,000 and 40,000 people respectively during the projection period. 
 (from now on OFR), for instance, rose by 
22%, from 1.19 in 1998 to 1.45 in 2008. Continuing with this positive evolution, the INE 
forecasts a sustained increase in the OFR from 1.44 in 2009 to 1.70 in 2048. Under the 
favourable scenario it is assumed that there will be an even greater increase in the OFR 
than in the best estimate scenario, from 1.44 in 2009 to 2.14 in 2048, while in the 
unfavourable scenario it undergoes a slight increase over the first two decades projected, 
from 1.44 in 2009 to 1.49 in 2028, but then falls back to the value assumed for 2009. 
The evolution of mortality assumed by the INE implies that there will be a 
significant increase in life expectancy both at birth and at age 65. Life expectancy at birth is 
expected to increase by 6.25 and 5.50 years for men and women respectively, from 78.03 
and 84.3 years in 2009 to 84.37 and 89.88 in 2048. Life expectancy at age 65 will increase by 
4.07 and 4.33 years for men and women respectively, from 17.82 and 21.81 years in 2009 to 
21.89 and 26.14 years in 2048. The increase in life expectancy at birth is mainly due to the 
increased life expectancy for the elderly. The three demographic scenarios assumed show 
the same evolution of mortality for the projection period. 
 
Figure 2: Evolution of population in Spain and the demographic dependency ratio under various 
scenarios. Source: Own. 
The evolution of the population over the projection period for the scenarios 
specified is shown in Figure 2. During the early years the changes manifest themselves 
slowly, but by the last year of the projection the population may show very different 
results: under the normal scenario there would be around 45 million inhabitants, while in 
the optimistic and pessimistic scenarios there would be 58 and 37 million respectively. 
                                                 
10 The overall fecundity rate can be defined as the average number of children that will be born to one 
woman from a hypothetical cohort of women of childbearing years who were not exposed to mortality risk 
from birth until the end of their fertile period. 
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As regards the demographic dependency ratio - defined as the population aged 
between 16 and 64 divided by the population aged 65 and over - shown in the second part 
of Figure 2, over the three scenarios it will drop sharply over the next four decades, from 
4.06 in 2009 to 1.67, 1.78 and 1.59 in 2048 for the central, favourable and unfavourable 
scenarios respectively. At the end of the projection period a slight improvement can be 
seen in comparison with the situation in 2048: 2, 2.37 and 1.76 respectively in 2084.  
Macroeconomy 
As with the demographic aspect, three scenarios are also constructed with regard to 
the macroeconomic aspect. Their general outlines are as follows: 
1.-Central or "best estimate" scenario: This assumes that in 2048 the labour force 
participation rate and the employment rate of the Spanish economy will converge with the 
average rates recorded for the EU-15 during 200811. This scenario assumes average annual 
accumulated growth in productivity of 0.95%12
2.-Optimistic scenario: This assumes that in 2048 the labour force participation and 
employment rates of the Spanish economy will converge with the rates recorded in 
Germany during 2008. This scenario assumes average annual accumulated growth in 
productivity of 1.25%.  
.  
3.-Pessimistic scenario: This assumes that in 2048 the labour force participation and 
employment rates of the Spanish economy will converge with the rates recorded in Spain 
during 2008. This scenario assumes average annual accumulated growth in productivity of 
0.66%.  
For the first two years of the projection, 2009 and 2010, the hypotheses used for 
the average rates of labour force participation, employment and productivity under the 
three scenarios are the rates actually recorded for those years, while for 2011 it will be the 
rates recorded in the first quarter of that year.  
The combination of demographic and macroeconomic scenarios therefore 
determine 9 possible socio-demographic scenarios, as shown in Table 3: 
 
Table 3: Socio-demographic scenarios. 
Scenarios Macroeconomy Optimistic (2) 
Demography 
Normal (1) 
Demography 
Pessimistic (3) 
Macroeconomy 
Optimistic (2) D-E (2,2) D-E (1,2) 
 
D-E (3,2) 
Demography 
Normal (1) D-E (2,2) 
D-E (1,1) 
“best estímate”13
 
 D-E (3,1) 
Macroeconomy 
Pessimistic (3) D-E (2,3) D-E (1,3) 
 
D-E (3,3) 
                                                 
11 The EU-15 comprises Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, 
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom. 
12 The productivity hypothesis for 2011-2050 under the favourable scenario is the same as the productivity 
path assumed by the European Commission in the 2009 Ageing Report (2008).   
13 According to standard actuarial terminology, the “best-estimate” scenario is that obtained under “best-
estimate assumptions”. These assumptions reflect the best judgment of the experts as to future demographic 
and economic conditions that will probably affect the long-term financial viability of the system. 
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Figure 3 below shows the effect of various scenarios on the evolution of real GDP 
in base 100 for the whole projection period. In the case of extreme scenarios D-E (2,2) and 
D-E (3,3), the GDP in base 100 for the last year of the projection is 68% greater and 40% 
lower respectively than in central scenario D-E (1,1), or to put it another way, the GDP 
under the most favourable scenario is 2.79 times greater than in the least favourable. Figure 
3 also aims to show the effect the variations of the economic scenarios have on the normal 
demographic scenario and vice versa. It can be seen that the economic effects have a faster 
and greater impact on GDP, productivity, the participation rate and the employment rate 
than the demographic variations. At the end of the projection period, the real value of 
GDP under scenario D-E (1,2) is 1.76 times greater than under scenario D-E (1,3), while 
the relationship between scenarios D-E (2,1) and D-E (3,1) is 1.58 times greater.  
 
Figure 3: Evolution of real GDP in base 100, extreme scenarios, demographic and economic effects, 
and evolution of the contributor-retirement pensioner ratio under the normal and two most extreme 
scenarios. Source: Own. 
Finally, Figure 3 shows the estimated evolution of the contributor-pensioner ratio, 
which is the most important aspect for the authority that administers the pension system. It 
can be seen under any scenario that this is projected to deteriorate drastically over the 
coming years basically because of population ageing. In the most likely scenario, D-E (1,1), 
it drops from 3.46 in 2010 to 1.75 in 2052 and then recovers to 2.15 in the last year of the 
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projection. In the extreme scenarios, the results predicted for 2052 are 1.96 and 1.54 
respectively for D-E (2,2) and D-E (3,3), while for the last year of the projection they are 
2.56 and 1.77. 
4.-Main results 
Tables 4 and 5 below show the aggregate results for all regimes and scenarios for 
some of the elements included in the actuarial balance over two projection periods: 75 
years and 50 years respectively. The disaggregated results for the general regime and the 
rest are shown in Appendix 3. 
The results are unequivocal in so far as the system's financial health is far more 
delicate than it may appear. Even under what could be termed the most optimistic 
scenarios the results are very poor for both the 50 and the 75-year projection horizon. 
If the “best estimate” - scenario D-E (1,1) - is taken as a benchmark, in the 75-year 
balance it can be seen that the first deficit already makes an appearance in 201014
The result of the actuarial balance is -13.90%, i.e. the contribution rate would have 
to be increased by 13.90% from the very start and for the entire projection horizon in 
order to cover all the scheduled pensions. The increase in the income rate for the period 
would be 70%. The results for the best and worst scenarios considered are -10.34% and     
-18.1% respectively. The result for the 50-year actuarial balance is -12.39%, slightly better 
than the result for the 75-year balance but not much better because the projected effect of 
ageing is very intense during the first 30 years of the projection period. However, this is 
expected to at least partially reverse in the last 25 years of the projection period, as shown 
in Figures 1 and 2. 
. 
According to this scenario, the reserve fund will be exhausted in 2019, while under the 
best, D-E (2,2), and worst, D-E (3,3), scenarios it runs out in 2020 and 2018 respectively. 
This result is logical seeing that the early years of the projection assume that changes come 
about slowly and do not veer away significantly from the trends shown under the central 
scenario, as can be seen in Figures 2 and 3 in the previous section. 
The result for the solvency ratio in the best estimate is barely 0.5957 on average, as 
seen using Formula 2, which compares the system's assets and liabilities for the entire 
projection horizon. If no additional resources are injected, it will not be possible to pay 
approximately 41.43% of scheduled pensions15
The solvency index for the 50-year actuarial balance is slightly better, though not 
much for the same reason that we mentioned earlier: the demographic aspects will start to 
work in the system's favour from 2052. 
. The solvency index does not significantly 
improve under the most optimistic scenario, 0.6539, i.e. although the demographic and 
economic aspects are much better than predicted, on average and without additional 
resources 34.61% of scheduled pensions would be unpaid or not covered.  
 
                                                 
14 It should be pointed out that the official results for social security in Spain show a treasury surplus because 
they include the return on the reserve fund, but if this were not taken into account there would be a deficit. 
15 If the assumption that the minimum pension were financed in its entirety had been adopted, as is usual in 
official projections, the solvency index would rise to 0.631 under the most likely scenario.   
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Table 5: Elements of the 75-year actuarial balance 2010-2084. 
Present value at January 2010 in thousands of millions of euros. Consolidated for all regimes. 
 
D-E 
(1,1) 
B-B 
D-E 
(1,2) 
B-O 
D-E 
(1,3) 
B-P 
D-E 
(2,1) 
O-B 
D-E 
(2,2) 
O-O 
D-E 
(2,3) 
O-P 
D-E 
(3,1) 
P-B 
D-E 
(3,2) 
P-O 
D-E 
(3,3) 
P-P 
Income from contributions and government 
transfers 20 3,694.79  4,259.97 3,166.97 3,735.85 4,650.60 3,413.18 3,474.92 3,987.44 2,993.81 
Spending on pensions 6,307.51 6,887.26 5,877.17 6,333.29 7,079.21 6,013.34 6,183.07 6,737.86 5,770.19 
Initial deficit -2,612.72 -2,627.29 -2,710.20 -2,597.44 -2,428.61 -2,600.15 -2,708.15 -2,750.43 -2,776.37 
Trust fund assets at start of period21 40.13  40.13 40.13 40.13 40.13 40.13 40.13 40.13 40.13 
Open group unfunded obligation -2,572.58 -2,587.16 -2,670.07 -2,557.30 -2,388.47 -2,560.02 -2,668.02 -2,710.29 -2,736.24 
Ending target trust fund22 68.82  84.98 57.49 70.01 94.27 63.53 63.18 77.95 52.83 
Results for the period -2,641.40 -2,672.14 -2,727.56 -2,627.31 -2,482.75 -2,623.55 -2,731.20 -2,788.24 -2,789.07 
Aggregate contribution bases 18,999.23 2,1956.10 16,229.42 19,229.89 2,4017.70 17,526.34 17,840.92 20,520.21 15,318.54 
Summarized income rate 19.66 19.58 19.76 19.64 19.53 19.70 19.70 19.63 19.81 
Summarized cost rate 33.56 31.76 36.57 33.30 29.87 34.67 35.01 33.22 38.01 
Actuarial balance  -13.90 -12.17 -16.81 -13.66 -10.34 -14.97 -15.31 -13.59 -18.21 
Year of first deficit 2010 2010 2010 2010 2010 2010 2010 2010 2010 
Reserve fund exhausted (year) 2019 2020 2018 2019 2020 2018 2018 2019 2018 
Solvency Index 0.5857 0.6167 0.5404 0.5897 0.6539 0.5683 0.5627 0.5909 0.5210 
Results for the period as % share of GDP in 2010 250.63 253.54 258.80 249.29 235.57 248.93 259.15 264.56 264.64 
Results for the period as % of present value of 
GDPs for the period 4.15 3.65 5.03 3.81 3.10 4.49 4.57 4.06 5.45 
 
 
 
                                                 
20 A single annual rate of interest of 1.5% in real terms is used for discounting income and expenditure. 
21 At 31 December 2009 the social security reserve fund had accumulated a total of 60,022 million euros. As there is no separation by contingency, it is assumed that the reserve 
fund is disaggregated following the same criterion as the contribution rate. Therefore the amount accumulated by the reserve fund at the start of the projection period totalled 
40,133 million euros. 
22 A target reserve fund equal to predicted expenditure for the last year of the projection is considered, a standard hypothesis for this type of actuarial balance. On this subject see 
BOT (2010), OSFIC (2008) and AAD (2009).  
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Table 6: Elements of the 50-year actuarial balance 2010-2059. 
Present value at January 2010 in thousands of millions of euros. Consolidated for all regimes. 
 
D-E 
(1,1) 
B-B 
D-E 
(1,2) 
B-O 
D-E 
(1,3) 
B-P 
D-E 
(2,1) 
O-B 
D-E 
(2,2) 
O-O 
D-E 
(2,3) 
O-P 
D-E 
(3,1) 
P-B 
D-E 
(3,2) 
P-O 
D-E 
(3,3) 
P-P 
Income from contributions and government 
transfers 2,682.34 2,984.15 2,384.23 2,783.63 3,103.75 2,467.78 2,566.16 2,843.98 2,291.58 
Spending on pensions 4,339.96 4,565.91 4,166.76 4,373.41 4,603.55 4,196.75 4,155.20 4,368.60 3,993.26 
Initial deficit -1,657.61 -1,581.76 -1,782.54 -1,589.78 -1,499.80 -1,728.96 -1,589.03 -1,524.62 -1,701.68 
Trust fund assets at start of period 40.13 40.13 40.13 40.13 40.13 40.13 40.13 40.13 40.13 
Open group unfunded obligation -1,617.48 -1,541.63 -1,742.40 -1,549.64 -1,459.66 -1,688.83 -1,548.90 -1,484.49 -1,661.54 
Ending target trust fund 93.97 105.82 85.01 96.69 108.97 87.37 88.72 99.74 80.47 
Results for the period -1,711.45 -1,647.45 -1,827.41 -1,646.33 -1,568.63 -1,776.20 -1,637.62 -1,584.23 -1,742.01 
Aggregate contribution bases 13,813.82 15,401.10 12,242.00 14,349.72 16,034.40 12,683.79 13,226.11 14,672.52 11,792.68 
Summarized income rate 19.71 19.64 19.80 19.68 19.61 19.77 19.71 19.66 19.77 
Summarized cost rate 32.10 30.33 34.73 31.15 29.39 33.78 32.09 30.45 34.54 
Actuarial balance  -12.39 -10.70 -14.93 -11.47 -9.78 -14.00 -12.38 -10.80 -14.77 
Year of first deficit 2010 2010 2010 2010 2010 2010 2010 2010 2010 
Reserve fund exhausted (year) 2019 2020 2018 2019 2020 2018 2018 2019 2018 
Solvency Index 0.6140 0.6474 0.5702 0.6317 0.6671 0.5854 0.6141 0.6455 0.5724 
Results for the period as % share of GDP in 2010 162.39 156.32 173.39 156.21 148.84 168.53 155.38 150.32 165.29 
Results for the period as % of present value of 
GDPs for the period 3.70 3.20 4.47 3.43 2.93 4.19 3.64 3.17 4.37 
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In terms of GDP - the last two rows in Tables 4 and 5 - the results are even more 
striking. If the aim were to “ensure” payment of estimated pensions for the next 75 years, 
the initial financial contribution that would have to be added to the initial reserve fund 
under the “best estimate” - scenario D-E (1,1) - would be 250.6% of GDP for the base 
year, or “paid in instalments” at the rate of 4.15% of GDP for each year. If the benchmark 
were the contribution base for the base year, 8.39 times that contribution base would need 
to be injected to “ensure” benefits because the tax base ratio is stable and approximately 
0.299 of GDP. The best scenario, D-E (2,2), slightly reduces the initial injection needed to 
235.57% of GDP, though the reduction is greater if paid in instalments: 3.10% of GDP for 
each year.  
A wide variety of indicators deriving from the model developed can be extracted, 
two of which are shown in Figure 4: the amount of pensions that could be paid between 
2018 and 2020 depending on scenario using only the available resources, i.e. on the 
assumption that no explicit debt can be accumulated once the reserve fund is exhausted; 
and the contribution rate necessary to finance all the scheduled benefits from year to year. 
As far as the first is concerned, it can be seen that under scenario D-E (1,1) the minimum 
to be paid will be reached in 2051, this being 44.92% of scheduled benefits if the 
contribution rate is not increased or if the system does not accumulate explicit debt to 
finance successive deficits. In the last year of the projection period the system will only be 
able to fund 53.49% of scheduled benefits without help. Under the optimistic scenario, D-
E (2,2), the minimum level of funding will also be reached in the same year, but in this case 
52.37% of the benefits can be financed, while in the last year of the projection period this 
could reach 65.55%. 
 
Figure 4: Evolution of payable benefits as a percentage of scheduled benefits and the projected cost 
rate. Source: Own. 
As regards the projected cost rate - which could also be disaggregated following 
Equation 7 in Appendix 1 - under the normal scenario the maximum will be reached in 
2051 with 43.74% in the contribution rate needed to cover the scheduled payments. From 
then on the rate will decrease until it reaches 36.44% in the last year of the projection 
period. The most optimistic scenario reaches its maximum of a 37.27% increase in 2050, 
dropping to 29.51% by the last year of the projection period.  
Appendix 3 shows the disaggregated results for both projection horizons, 
distinguishing between the general regime and the rest, which includes the self-employed, 
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agriculture, sea workers, coal mining and household workers regimes along with the 
SOVI23
Finally a brief comparison is made of the results in an area of great concern to 
many researchers and institutions: the evolution of projected pension spending as a 
proportion of GDP, especially for the retirement contingency. We include data from 
papers by EC (2008), Gil et al (2007) and Jiménez-Ridruejo et al. (2009) for the 
comparison, and the results are shown in the following table.  
. The general regime is seen to be the one that would have the fewest treasury 
problems if it were completely independent, see Table 7, with the first treasury deficit not 
appearing until 2017 and the reserve fund still having resources until 2027 under the most 
likely scenario. Under the most optimistic scenario, D-E (2,2), the deficit could take an 
extra two years to appear and the reserve fund would not be exhausted until 2030. In the 
rest of the regimes the treasury deficit is already a fact and if they were independent there 
would be no trace of a reserve fund either. As far as the solvency index in the central 
scenario is concerned, the reading for the general regime at 0.6082 is very different from 
the one for the rest at 0.4897, and in any case far from what it should be in a solvent 
pension system. In the most optimistic scenario the indices rise to 0.6767 and 0.5531 
respectively for the general regime and the rest, which is still a very long way from 
solvency. 
 
Table 6:  Spending on retirement benefits as a proportion of GDP. 
Paper Initial year Year 2050 
EC (2008) 5.6% (2007) 12,3% 
Gil et al (2007) 5% (2005) 12% 
Jiménez-Ridruejo et al (2009) 5% (2005) 11,3% 
Our model, scenario D-E (1.1) 5.86% (2009) 13% 
As the table shows, there is a significant increase in pension spending as a 
proportion of GDP - more than double - in all the papers considered. We can use 
Equation 4 in Appendix 1 to briefly analyse what factors lie behind the difference between 
our result and the others. Demographic factors as represented in the demographic 
dependency rate show no significant differences between one paper and another, although 
it is true that this paper has assumed that the demographic dependency ratio will be worse 
than in the projections made by the other papers. As far as economic factors are 
concerned, it should be noted that we have taken into account how they have been affected 
by the economic crisis. 
The main point of divergence between this paper and the others is the institutional 
factor. The papers by Gil et al (2007) and Jiménez-Ridruejo et al (2009) show a sustained 
increase in the take-up ratio, rising from 64% to 70% and 77% respectively in 2050, while 
the take-up ratios observed by this paper go down from 65% in 2010 to 60%. This 
decrease can be explained by the extinction of the SOVI from 2050 and the fact that we 
have applied the principle of verifiable data and transactions at the effective date of the 
balance. This means that even though an increase in cover is expected, it will only be 
incorporated into the projection year by year once it can be verified. Finally, as regards the 
system's generosity rate, i.e. the quotient between the average pension and GDP per 
worker, the results presented in this paper show that there is an increase from 21.85% in 
2009 to 24.48% in 2050, whereas in the other papers analysed it either remains unchanged 
or decreases slightly. 
                                                 
23 The former Compulsory Old-Age and Permanent Disability Insurance regime (SOVI: Seguro Obligatorio 
de Vejez e Invalidez).  
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5.-Final remarks and future research 
Compiling an actuarial balance of the pay-as-you-go system at set times is a practice 
found in Social Security Administrations in the most advanced countries. It is normally 
carried out by prestigious independent organizations, for example the Office of the Chief 
Actuary or equivalent in the US, Canada and the UK. The balance is usually audited and is 
aimed at depoliticizing the management of the system by bringing the planning horizon of 
the politicians closer to that of the system itself, revealing the pension system's true 
situation of solvency or sustainability, and quantifying the impact of any reforms to be 
carried out. 
In this paper we have formulated an approximation of the US actuarial balance for 
the public retirement pension system in Spain for a set of credible scenarios in order to 
determine a consistent indicator of the system's financial health and enable us to answer 
the question as to whether there is any justification for reforming the pension system. This 
is an important point since only a short while ago the government authorities in Spain were 
systematically denying the existence of sustainability problems, MTIN (2008). 
The results leave little room for doubt that parametric reform  would be justified. 
Even under the most optimistic scenarios, the results of the solvency index and the 
actuarial balance itself are very negative. This begs the question as to whether the reform - 
without entering into a discussion about its being the most suitable one - should have been 
carried out earlier. It is likely that if there had been some sort of official, independent 
instrument produced from time to time, such as the actuarial balance compiled in this 
paper, the reform would indeed have been introduced earlier because, although the 
system's treasury situation enabled benefit payments to be made, the system's solvency, due 
to problems of actuarial imbalance caused by the lack of adjustment to the system's 
parameters and the projected effect of ageing, was already in a perilous state even though 
the impression it conveyed was the opposite. Taking into account the way the system has 
been affected by the economic crisis, i.e. fewer contributors and more pensioners, makes 
the solvency indicator deteriorate even faster. 
 A question closely linked to the previous one concerns what the impact of the 
pension reform would be. If an instrument such as that described had been in place, it 
would have been possible to show transparently what the benefits of the changes 
introduced into the system would be. It would also enable an assessment to be made to 
discover whether the reform is actually a solution to sustainability problems or whether it is 
simply a stopgap to defer treasury problems that will make it necessary to introduce more 
reforms in the not too distant future. Clearly this area needs to be investigated further and 
will be the subject of a future paper. 
Finally, as other researchers such as Boado-Penas et al (2008) and Vidal-Meliá et al 
(2009) have recommended, it would certainly be advisable to incorporate into the Spanish 
public pension system the obligation to compile an actuarial balance every year in order to 
improve its transparency and solvency and to enable any reforms introduced into the 
system to be assessed. This would bring the system into line with the trend seen in other 
countries which aims to introduce methodology typical of accounting and actuarial analysis 
into the public management of pay-as-you-go systems. 
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Appendix 1: The aggregate accounting projection model (AAM) of spending on 
pensions.  
AAMs are often referred to by some authors as actuarial models, although 
paradoxically they take a more financial than actuarial approach since they are based on 
determining a succession of cash flow statements rather than focusing on the actuarial 
commitments taken on by the system. According to TEPC (2007) and Lefevbre (2007), 
they are also often used by public administrations and organizations. The Ageing Working 
Group, the technical working group of the economic policy committee of the European 
Union responsible for projecting expenditure, follows this basically deterministic approach, 
although not all countries apply it. The World Bank uses what is known as the PROST 
(Pension Reform Options Simulation Toolkit) model, which is based on this methodology, 
along with the International Labour Organization, which has its own model called the ILO 
Pension Model. 
If we start from this simple identity: 
t
p
tt ·APLEP ≡                                                         [3.] 
where: tEP  is expenditure on pensions in year t, ptL  is the number of pensioners during 
year t, and tAP  is the average pension for year t. Following García-García (2009), the 
above identity can be developed as much as desired, in such a way that the typical form in 
which it is presented is: 
   
  
  

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t
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t
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t
t
t
L
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AP·
L
L·
L
L·
L
L·
L
L
GDP
EP
+
−
−
+
=
                    
[4.] 
z
tL
+  is the population older than z years (the normal age of retirement, or the effective age 
of retirement) during year t, zetL
−  is the population aged between e years (minimum legal 
age to join the labour market) and z years during year t, atL  is the active population in year 
t, etL  is the employed population in year t, and tGDP  is the Gross Domestic Product for 
year t at current year t prices. 
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In this case it can be seen that spending on pensions as a proportion of GDP can be 
broken down into the product of five factors:  
1) ze
t
z
t
L
L
−
+
 is the old-age dependency ratio, defined as the population aged over z years 
as a proportion of the working age population.  
2) a
t
ze
t
L
L −  is the inverse of the participation rate, defined as the active population as a 
proportion of the working age population. 
3) e
t
a
t
L
L  is the inverse of the employment rate, defined as the number of people 
working as a proportion of the active population. 
4) z
t
p
t
L
L
+ is the take-up ratio or the coverage of the pension system, defined as 
pensioners as a proportion of the population aged over z years. 
5) e
tt
t
LGDP
AP  is the benefit ratio, defined as the ratio between the average pension 
and average work productivity.  
With such a level of disaggregation it is easy to distinguish the three groups of factors 
that define the evolution of pension spending as a proportion of GDP (demographic, 
economic and and the rules governing the pension system (coverage, pension levels).). It 
should be pointed out that, in line with Boado-Penas and Vidal-Meliá (2011), from the 
point of view of the authority governing a particular pension system, it is better to relate all 
the magnitudes indexed to the system's contribution base in year t, and that is how it 
appears in reports compiled by long-established Social Security Administrations. In fact, if 
it is taken into account that the salary income that forms part of the GDP in any particular 
year tW  can be expressed as the product of the average salary of the working population in 
the economy as a whole, etW and working population 
e
tL : 
L.WW etett =                                                              [5.] 
and if we consider that the number of contributors in year t L.βC ettt = , is a proportion βt  
of the working population obliged to contribute, and the average salary of the contributors 
during year t, CottW , is 
e
tt
Cot
t W.δW =  is a proportion tδ  of the average salary of the 
working population of the economy as a whole, the aggregate contribution base for year t 
at year t current prices, tACB , will be: 

ttt
W
e
tt
Ct
e
ttt .W.δβW.δ.L.βACB
Cot
t
== 
                                    
[6.] 
which, if substituted by the previous expression in 4, 
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[7.] 
There remains an expression in which the financial ratio appears explicitly, which 
according to Plamondon et al (2002) is much more useful from the point of view of the 
authority that administers the system, and the inverse of the employment rate corrected by 
those who work and effectively contribute. It seems clear that the value of the quotient in 
equation 7 is the theoretical contribution rate θ*t  which would have to be applied in that 
year in order for the system's income to be coincident with the benefits to be paid in that 
year, i.e. the contribution rate that maintains year-to-year financial equilibrium. 
Income from contributions, like expenditure, can be broken down into the product 
of the number of contributors and the average contribution: 
tt
AC
Cot
tttt ·ACBθW·θ·CIC
t
=≡

                                              [8.] 
where tIC  is the income from contributions during year t, and tAC  is the average 
contribution during year t. 
Income from contributions as a proportion of GDP can be broken down into: 
t
ACB
W
e
t
e
tttt
t
t
GDP
·LW··βδ·θ·
GDP
IC
t
t


≡
                                            
[9.] 
which according to the aggregate contribution base, naturally, is the contribution rate for 
each year: t
t
t θ
ACB
IC
≡  
Appendix 2: Brief description of the economic, financial and actuarial relations. 
This appendix gives a brief description of the program developed in Mahtlab®24
A set of labour force participation rates for the population are assumed, 
distinguishing by age, gender and professional category for each period t equal to 
 
which enables the results shown in Section 4 to be obtained. 
( )st,X,LF . The labour force participation rate is understood by the following expression:  
( ) ( )
( )
0,1s 1,2,...T;t  z;1,-z1,...,ee,X
st,X,L
st,X,Lst,X,LF
Population
population Active
a
==+=
=


                            
[10.] 
where z represents the maximum age an individual stays in the labour market. 
                                                 
24 Mahtlab® is a high-level language and interactive environment that enables intensive skills to be performed 
computationally faster than with traditional programming languages such as C, C++ and Fortran. 
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The total active population for each period t is determined by aggregating the active 
population by age, gender and type ( )∑∑
= =
=
z
eX
1
0s
aa
t st,X,LL . Afterwards the labour force 
participation rate for the economy as a whole can be obtained: ze
t
a
t
t L
LLF −=  
If a set of employment rates is assumed by ( )st,X,ER , distinguishing by gender 
and age too, for each period t the working population is defined by the following equation: 
( ) ( ) ( )
0,1s 1,2,...T; tz;1,-z1,...,ee,X
sX,·LsX,ERst,X,L att
e
t
==+=
=
                        
[11.] 
In the same way as for the total active population, the total working population is obtained 
by aggregating the population, ( )∑∑
= =
=
z
eX
1
0s
e
t
e
t sX,LL . 
The rate of variation (increase or decrease) in the working population can be 
obtained: 
e
t
e
t
e
1te
t L
LL
ΔL
−
= +                                                     [12.] 
If we add the assumption of the rate of variation in average work productivity tΔlp , using 
the following accounting identity the rate of variation in GDP in real terms is obtained: 
t
e
tt
e
tt ·ΔΔlΔLΔlpΔLΔgdp ++=                               [13.] 
The process continues determining the number of contributors and the average 
contributions. The contributors to social security will be divided up according to the 
regime in which they are registered: 
( ) ( ) ( )sX,Lrs,X,Covrs,X,C tett ⋅=                               [14.] 
where ( )rs,X,Ct  is the number of contributors of age X and gender S registered in regime 
r as working during year t, which in the start year is derived directly from SS data; and 
( )rs,X,Covt  is the proportion of workers that, having the obligation to contribute, actually 
do so. 
Once the number of contributors has been projected, a projection has to be made 
for the average contribution. The first step for this is to obtain the contribution bases. 
Following Plamodom et al (2002), the contribution base for each contributor will vary in 
accordance with the following expression: 
( ) ( ) ( ) 





⋅+⋅=
t
1-t
tt SS
W
ΔTW1rs,X,SSrs,X,W                            [15.] 
where ( )rs,X,Wt  is the contribution base of a contributor of age X, gender s and regime r 
during period t, tΔTW  is the rate of annual variation in the accumulated tax base, 
( )rs,X,SS  is the salary scale of an individual of age X, gender s and regime r. The latter 
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element is the one that, starting with the average contribution base, enables us to obtain 
heterogeneity as regards age, gender and regime.  
The average salary scale weighted by the number of contributors is determined by: 
( ) ( )∑∑∑
= = =





 ⋅
=
R
1r
1
0s
z
eX t
t
t C
rs,X,Crs,X,SSSS                              [16.] 
where tC  is the total number of contributors. Once the above variables have been 
obtained, they need to be filtered in order for the contribution bases to remain within their 
maximum and minimum limits. 
( )
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
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[17.] 
with ( ) rCBdt  and ( ) rCBut being the minimum and maximum contribution bases in force 
during period t. 
Once the effective contribution base has been obtained, the effective contribution 
for each affiliate to the system can be calculated. This contribution will be the product of 
the effective contribution base and the contribution rate for the retirement contingency, θ . 
Therefore the total income from contributions from affiliates of age X, gender s and 
regime r in period t, ( )rs,X,ICt , will be: 
( ) ( ) ( )
rscontributo ofNumber 
t
oncontributi from Income
ttt rs,X,C rs,X,CBθrs,X,IC ⋅⋅=
                               
[18.] 
The contributions that each affiliate makes can be disaggregated according to the 
contingencies covered. Thus the income from contributions will be: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )∑∑
==
=⋅⋅=
I
1i
i
tt
I
1i
t
i
tt rs,X,ICrs,X,Crs,X,CBθrs,X,IC
          
[19.] 
with θit  being the contribution rate by contingency. Therefore the sum of the contribution 
rates by contingency should be equal to the total contribution rate25 ∑
=
=
I
1i
i
tt θθ 
  
y 
( )rs,X,ICit , the income from contributions from affiliates of age X and gender s registered 
in regime r to cover contingency i26
The total income from contributions will be: 
. 
( )∑∑∑∑
= = = =
=
R
1r
1
0s
z
eX
I
1i
tt rs,X,ICIC
                                              
[20.] 
Finally, if we add to the previous result the contributions made by the state to cover 
items in connection with the supplement to the minimum retirement benefits or explicit 
redistribution, tOI , the total income will be obtained: 
                                                 
25 In the Spanish social security system there is no separation of contribution rates by contingency, and this 
naturally makes the accounts less clear and prevents us from compiling an actuarial income statement by 
contingency. 
26 In this paper is only considered the retirement contingency. 
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ttt OIICIT +=
                                                                          
[21.] 
Retirement pensions. 
The retirement pensions are projected first, and within them the pensioners already 
existing at 31/12/2009. Hence the evolution of the number of pensioners at the end of the 
year will be27
( ) ( ) ( )rs,X,DRrs,X,Lrs,1,XL BtB 1tBt −=+ −
: 
                               [22.] 
( ) ( ) ( )rs,X,0,5DRrs,1,XLrs,1,XNL BtBtBt ++=+                    [23.] 
where ( )rs,X,LBt : Number of pensioners of age X and gender s registered in regime r, 
already existing at 31/12 in year t-1 who continue as pensioners at 31/12 of year t (and 
therefore are one year older), and ( )rs,X,DRBt : Number of decrements of age X and 
gender s registered in regime r. In the case of retirement, the only decrements  considered 
are those due to death, which occur between 31/12 of year t-1 and 31/12 of year t. The 
number of deaths is determined by the projected mortality tables for each year t: 
( ) =rs,X,DR Bt ( ) ( )sX,qrs,X,L tB 1-t ⋅                                  [24.] 
where ( )sX,qt : Mortality rate of an individual of age X and gender s for year t, i.e. the 
probability that an individual of age x and gender s will not live another year in year t. 
Finally, ( )rs,1,XNLBt +  is the average number of pensioners for the retirement 
contingency during period t, who at the beginning of the period were of age X and gender 
s registered in regime r. In other words, those that are alive at the end of the year 
( )rs,1,XLBt +  are distinguished from the average number for the year ( )rs,1,XNLBt + , to 
which those who started to receive a pension that same year will need to be added. 
For each period t of the projection, the annual pension already in payment in the 
base year to a retirement pensioner of age X and gender s registered in regime r, ( )rs,X,PBt
, will be determined according to the indexation rule: 
              
( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( ) 











+⋅= ∏
=
Min
t
Max
t
t
1i
B
0
B
t rP,rP,iπ1rs,X,PMinMaxrs,X,P
           
[25.] 
where ( )iπ  is the projected value in year t of the variable by which the pensions are 
indexed, and ( )rPMINt y ( )rPMAXt  are the minimum and maximum retirement pensions for 
year t in regime r. 
The spending on retirement pensions for pensioners already receiving pension will 
be determined by the product of that average pension and the number of pensioners by 
year: 
( ) ( ) ( )rs,X,Prs,X,NLrs,X,EP BtBtBt ⋅=                                 [26.] 
                                                 
27 Similar approaches to the evolution of the number of retirement pensioners can be found in TEPC (2007), 
Gil et al (2007) and Moral-Arce et al (2008), although no distinction is made between pre-existing pensioners 
and those “created” by the model.  
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with ( )rs,X,EPBt  being the spending on retirement pensions for pensioners already 
receiving pension in the base year, of age X and gender s registered in regime r during 
period t. 
The total spending on retirement pensions already in payment at the valuation date 
for each period t will be: 
  ( )∑∑ ∑
= = =
=
R
1r
S
1s
1-w
XX
B
t
B
t
i
1
rs,X,EPEP
                                      
[27.] 
The number of new retirement pension recipients per age and gender during period 
t, ( )rs,X,NR t , will be obtained according to the following expression28
( ) ( ) ( )rs,X,PPRrs,X,Npcrs,X,NR ttt ⋅=
: 
                      [28.]   
                          
f
j
e
j X,...,XX =    2,1s =    R1,..,r =  
with ( )rs,X,Npct  being the new pensioner coefficient, i.e. the percentage of new entries of 
age X, gender s and regime r during year t out of the population that could potentially be 
entitled to that pension. ( )rs,X,PPR t  is the population of age X and gender s that could 
“potentially” be entitled to retirement pension during period t.  
This variable, the proxy variable for the number of affiliates whether in employment or 
not, is obtained as the product of the average labour force participation rate of the 
generation born in year H (H = t - X), HtFL  and the total population ( )sX,Lt .  
Once the number of new pensioners by age and gender has been obtained, they 
need to be distributed by years contributed towards retirement. This distribution will be 
carried out following this expression: 
( )rs,k,X,r)·ds,(X,NRr))s,k,(X,NR tt =                                  [29.] 
               
f
j
e
j X,...,XX =      K1,...,k =          
where t)s,k,NR(X,  is the number of new pensioners from affiliates of age X, gender s 
and accumulated years contributed k during period t, and ( )ks,X,d  is the coefficient 
enabling the new entries to be distributed according to the accumulated number of years 
contributed: 
 ( ) 1sk,X,d
K
1k
=∑
=
   fj
e
j X,...,XX =  2,1s =                        [30.] 
Pensioners for the retirement contingency are divided according to age, gender, 
when they retired, the number of years contributed when they retired and regime. The 
number of pensioners can be calculated with the following expressions: 
If  hX =  
( ) ( )
   t  year of end theat  pensioners ofNumber 
t
P
t rk,s,h,NRrk,a,h,s,1,hL =+                                 [31.] 
                                                 
28 Based on ideas from the paper by Blanco et al. (2001), revisited by López-García (2008). 
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( ) ( )
   t  year   inpensioners ofnumber    Average
t
P
t rk,s,h,0,5NRrk,h,s,1,hNL =+                                 [32.] 
If hX >  
( ) ( ) ( )rk,h,s,X,DRrk,h,s,X,Lrk,h,s,1,XL PtP 1tPt −=+ −                       [33.] 
( ) ( ) ( )rk,h,s,X,0,5DRrk,h,s,1,XLrk,h,s,1,XNL PtPtPt ++=+            [34.] 
with ( )rk,h,s,X,DRPt  being the number of deaths of pensioners of age x, gender s, who 
started to receive their pension when they were aged h years and accumulated k years of 
contributions in regime r. In this contingency their dynamic is determined by the mortality 
tables for that year, ( ) ( ) ( )sX,qrk,h,s,X,Lrk,h,s,X,DR tP 1tPt ⋅= − . ( )rk,h,s,1,XLPt +  is the 
number of pensioners of age x, gender s, who started to receive their pension when they 
were aged h years and accumulated k years of contributions in regime r, who were already 
pensioners at the start of the year and continued being pensioners at the end of it. They 
will also be determined by the mortality tables for each year. ( )rk,h,s,1,XNLPt +  is the 
average number of pensioners for the retirement contingency during period t, who at the 
start of the period were aged X, gender s, and who started to receive their pension when 
they were h years and accumulated k years of contributions, registered in regime r.  
The average pension that each type of representative pensioner will receive will 
depend on the initial average pension and the successive indexations that come about. The 
initial average pension will be calculated according to the legislation in force, the number of 
years contributed, age at time of retirement, and the regulating base: 
( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )[ ] ( )[ ]rP,rP,rk,s,h,BRrk,s,h,ACαhλMaxMinrk,h,s,h,P MAX1,tMIN1,t1tt1r1rP1,t ⋅⋅=  
[35.] 
where ( )rk,h,s,h,P P1,t : Initial pension for a retirement contingency pensioner of age h, 
with k years contributed and of gender s, registered in regime r; ( )hλ1r : Percentage 
according to age that is applied to the regulating base to calculate the retirement pension; 
( )rk,s,h,ACt : Average number of accumulated years contributed by an affiliate of age X; 
( )( )rk,s,h,ACα t1r : Percentage according to the number of years contributed by the 
pensioner that is applied to the regulating base to calculate the retirement pension; 
( )rk,s,h,BR1t : Regulating base of an affiliate who starts to receive retirement pension at 
age h, with k years contributed, of gender s and registered in regime r. This variable will be 
determined by the following expression: 
( ) ( ) ( )r)s,X,tBR(1*rk,s,h,BRrk, sh,BR tt1t +=+                         [36.]  
where ( )rs,X,tBR t  is the annual rate of variation of the regulating base. This variable will 
be obtained as a weighted average of the growth rate of the contribution bases for the 15 
years previous to the year the regulation base is determined. 
The evolution of the pension at dates later than the period in which it was awarded 
is determined by the rule of indexation in force: 
( ) ( ) ( )( ) 











+⋅= ∏
=
MAX1,
t'
MIN1,
t'
t
1i
P1,
t
P1,
t' P,P,iπ1rk,h,s,h,PMaxMinrk,h,s,X,P
         
[37.] 
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where ( )rk,h,s,X,P P1,t' : Retirement pension in period t of a pensioner of age X and gender 
s registered in regime r who started to receive the pension at age h having contributed k 
years; and h)-(Xtt' += : Number of periods that have passed since the pensioner started 
to receive the pension. 
Therefore spending on pensions for the all the affiliates of age X, gender S, regime 
r who started to receive retirement pension at age h is: 
( ) ( ) ( )rk,h,s,X,NLrk,h,s,X,Prk,h,s,X,EP PtPtPt ⋅=                        [38.] 
The total spending on retirement pensions generated by the model can be 
expressed as: 
( )∑∑∑∑∑
= = = ≥ =
=
R
1r
1
0s
X
Xh
1-w
hX
K
1k
P
t
P
t
F
1
i
1
rk,h,s,X,EPEP
                                  
[39.] 
and the total spending on pensions: 
P
t
B
tt EPEPEP +=
                                                          
[40.] 
 
Surplus/Deficit and reserve fund of the pension system. 
The current treasury deficit or surplus (R) for period t is obtained as the difference 
between the total income from contributions and the total spending by the pension system: 
ttt ETITR −=                                            [41.] 
and therefore the evolution of the reserve fund is: 
( ) t1tt bRr1TFTF ++= −                                   [42.] 
where tTF : Reserve fund for year t; b: Proportion of the result for year t which is allocated 
to make up the reserve fund, and r: the projected yield of the reserve fund. 
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Appendix 3: Breakdown of main results by regime 
 
Table 7: Elements of the 75-year actuarial balance 2010-2084. 
Present value at January 2010 in thousands of millions of euros. General regime. 
 
D-E 
(1,1) 
B-B 
D-E 
(1,2) 
B-O 
D-E 
(1,3) 
B-P 
D-E 
(2,1) 
O-B 
D-E 
(2,2) 
O-O 
D-E 
(2,3) 
O-P 
D-E 
(3,1) 
P-B 
D-E 
(3,2) 
P-O 
D-E 
(3,3) 
P-P 
Income from contributions and government 
transfers 3,113.69 3,595.81 2,664.52 3,386.93 3,935.90 2,878.51 2,923.25 3,359.91 2,514.63 
Spending on pensions 5,128.69 5,634.64 4,766.33 5,263.25 5,797.11 4,881.30 5,024.54 5,509.25 4,677.02 
Initial deficit -2,015.01 -2,038.83 -2,101.81 -1,876.32 -1,861.22 -2,002.80 -2,101.29 -2,149.34 -2,162.38 
Trust fund assets at start of period 40.13 40.13 40.13 40.13 40.13 40.13 40.13 40.13 40.13 
Open group unfunded obligation -1,974.87 -1,998.69 -2,061.67 -1,836.18 -1,821.08 -1,962.66 -2,061.16 -2,109.21 -2,122.25 
Ending target trust fund 56.97 71.05 47.45 63.20 78.93 52.56 52.25 65.08 43.56 
Results for the period -2,031.85 -2,069.74 -2,109.12 -1,899.38 -1,900.02 -2,015.22 -2,113.40 -2,174.29 -2,165.81 
Aggregate contribution bases 15,993.08 18,490.68 13,658.23 17,419.81 20,266.76 14,774.80 14,999.49 17,259.62 12,876.73 
Summarized income rate 19.72 19.66 19.80 19.67 19.62 19.75 19.76 19.70 19.84 
Summarized cost rate 32.42 30.86 35.24 30.58 28.99 33.39 33.85 32.30 36.66 
Actuarial balance  -12.70 -11.19 -15.44 -10.90 -9.38 -13.64 -14.09 -12.60 -16.82 
Year of first deficit 2017 2019 2016 2017 2019 2016 2017 2019 2016 
Reserve fund exhausted (year) 2027 2030 2025 2027 2030 2025 2027 2029 2025 
Solvency index 0.6082 0.6372 0.5619 0.6434 0.6767 0.5916 0.5837 0.6099 0.5412 
Results for the period as % share of GDP in 2010 192.79 196.39 200.12 180.22 180.28 191.21 200.53 206.31 205.50 
Results for the period as % of present value of 
GDPs for the period 3.19 2.82 3.89 2.75 2.37 3.45 3.53 3.17 4.23 
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Table 8: Elements of the 75-year actuarial balance 2010-2084. 
Present value at January 2010 in thousands of millions of euros. Other regimes. 
Items 
D-E 
(1,1) 
B-B 
D-E 
(1,2) 
B-O 
D-E 
(1,3) 
B-P 
D-E 
(2,1) 
O-B 
D-E 
(2,2) 
O-O 
D-E 
(2,3) 
O-P 
D-E 
(3,1) 
P-B 
D-E 
(3,2) 
P-O 
D-E 
(3,3) 
P-P 
Income from contributions and government 
transfers 581.11 664.16 502.45 622.16 714.71 534.68 551.67 627.53 479.18 
Spending on pensions 1,178.82 1,252.62 1,110.84 1,204.59 1,282.10 1,132.04 1,158.54 1,228.62 10,93.17 
Initial deficit -597.71 -588.47 -608.39 -582.43 -567.39 -597.36 -606.86 -601.09 -613.99 
Trust fund assets at start of period 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Open group unfunded obligation -597.71 -588.47 -608.39 -582.43 -567.39 -597.36 -606.86 -601.09 -613.99 
Ending target trust fund 7.84 9.22 6.65 8.62 10.16 7.31 7.23 8.50 6.14 
Results for the period -605.55 -597.69 -615.05 -591.05 -577.55 -604.67 -614.09 -609.59 -620.13 
Aggregate contribution bases 3,006.15 3,465.43 2,571.19 3,236.81 3,750.94 2,751.54 2,841.43 3,260.59 2,441.81 
Summarized income rate 19.33 19.17 19.54 19.22 19.05 19.43 19.42 19.25 19.62 
Summarized cost rate 39.47 36.41 43.46 37.48 34.45 41.41 41.03 37.94 45.02 
Actuarial balance  -20.14 -17.25 -23.92 -18.26 -15.40 -21.98 -21.61 -18.70 -25.40 
Year of first deficit 2010 2010 2010 2010 2010 2010 2010 2010 2010 
Reserve fund exhausted (year) 2010 2010 2010 2010 2010 2010 2010 2010 2010 
Solvency index 0.4897 0.5263 0.4496 0.5128 0.5531 0.4693 0.4732 0.5073 0.4359 
Results for the period as % share of GDP in 2010 57.46 56.71 58.36 56.08 54.80 57.37 58.27 57.84 58.84 
Results for the period as % of present value of 
GDPs for the period 0.95 0.82 1.13 0.86 0.72 1.03 1.03 0.89 1.21 
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Table 9: Elements of the 50-year actuarial balance 2010-2059. 
Present value at January 2010 in thousands of millions of euros. General regime. 
Items 
D-E 
(1,1) 
B-B 
D-E 
(1,2) 
B-O 
D-E 
(1,3) 
B-P 
D-E 
(2,1) 
O-B 
D-E 
(2,2) 
O-O 
D-E 
(2,3) 
O-P 
D-E 
(3,1) 
P-B 
D-E 
(3,2) 
P-O 
D-E 
(3,3) 
P-P 
Income from contributions and government 
transfers 2,258.17 2,515.62 2,004.48 2,346.35 2,619.90 2,077.21 2,192.46 2,438.19 1,950.08 
Spending on pensions 3,504.29 3,701.41 3,358.33 3,532.30 3,733.14 3,383.60 3,482.34 3,676.62 3,338.48 
Initial deficit -1,246.12 -1,185.80 -1,353.85 -1,185.95 -1,113.24 -1,306.39 -1,289.88 -1,238.44 -1,388.40 
Trust fund assets at start of period 40.13 40.13 40.13 40.13 40.13 40.13 40.13 40.13 40.13 
Open group unfunded obligation -1,205.98 -1,145.66 -1,313.72 -1,145.82 -1,073.11 -1,266.26 -1,249.74 -1,198.30 -1,348.26 
Ending target trust fund 77.22 87.55 69.68 79.50 90.21 71.68 75.45 85.48 68.12 
Results for the period -1,283.20 -1,233.21 -1,383.40 -1,225.32 -1,163.32 -1,337.94 -1,325.19 -1,283.78 -1,416.39 
Aggregate contribution bases 11,614.66 12,953.72 10,291.60 12,076.23 13,499.64 10,672.12 11,270.82 12,548.45 10,007.07 
Summarized income rate 19.79 19.73 19.87 19.76 19.70 19.84 19.81 19.75 19.89 
Summarized cost rate 30.84 29.25 33.31 29.91 28.32 32.38 31.57 29.98 34.04 
Actuarial balance  -11.05 -9.52 -13.44 -10.15 -8.62 -12.54 -11.76 -10.23 -14.15 
Year of first deficit 2017 2019 2016 2017 2019 2016 2017 2019 2016 
Reserve fund exhausted (year) 2027 2030 2025 2027 2030 2025 2027 2029 2025 
Solvency index 0.6417 0.6745 0.5964 0.6607 0.6957 0.6128 0.6275 0.6588 0.5842 
Results for the period as % share of GDP in 2010 121.76 117.01 131.26 116.26 110.38 126.95 125.74 121.81 134.39 
Results for the period as % of present value of 
GDPs for the period 2.77 2.40 3.38 2.55 2.17 3.16 2.95 2.57 3.56 
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Table 10: Elements of the 50-year actuarial balance 2010-2059. 
Present value at January 2010 in thousands of millions of euros. Other regimes. 
Items 
D-E 
(1,1) 
B-B 
D-E 
(1,2) 
B-O 
D-E 
(1,3) 
B-P 
D-E 
(2,1) 
O-B 
D-E 
(2,2) 
O-O 
D-E 
(2,3) 
O-P 
D-E 
(3,1) 
P-B 
D-E 
(3,2) 
P-O 
D-E 
(3,3) 
P-P 
Income from contributions and government 
transfers 424.17 468.53 379.75 437.28 483.85 390.58 373.70 405.79 341.49 
Spending on pensions 835.67 864.50 808.43 841.11 870.41 813.15 672.86 691.98 654.77 
Initial deficit -411.50 -395.96 -428.68 -403.83 -386.56 -422.57 -299.16 -286.19 -313.28 
Trust fund assets at start of period 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Open group unfunded obligation -411.50 -395.96 -428.68 -403.83 -386.56 -422.57 -299.16 -286.19 -313.28 
Ending target trust fund 16.75 18.27 15.33 17.19 18.76 15.69 13.28 14.27 12.34 
Results for the period -428.25 -414.24 -444.01 -421.02 -405.32 -438.26 -312.43 -300.45 -325.62 
Aggregate contribution bases 2,199.16 2,447.39 1,950.39 2,273.49 2,534.76 2,011.67 1,955.28 2,124.07 1785.61 
Summarized income rate 19.29 19.14 19.47 19.23 19.09 19.42 19.11 19.10 19.12 
Summarized cost rate 38.76 36.07 42.24 37.75 35.08 41.20 35.09 33.25 37.36 
Actuarial balance  -19.47 -16.93 -22.77 -18.52 -15.99 -21.79 -15.98 -14.15 -18.24 
Year of first deficit 2010 2010 2010 2010 2010 2010 2010 2010 2010 
Reserve fund exhausted (year) 2010 2010 2010 2010 2010 2010 2010 2010 2010 
Solvency index 0.4976 0.5308 0.4610 0.5095 0.5442 0.4712 0.5446 0.5746 0.5119 
Results for the period as % share of GDP in 2010 40.63 39.30 42.13 39.95 38.46 41.58 29.65 28.51 30.90 
Results for the period as % of present value of 
GDPs for the period 0.93 0.80 1.09 0.88 0.76 1.03 0.69 0.60 0.82 
 
 
 
 
 
